

there's capital required in the production function

$$Y = (K^d)^a (N^d)^{1-a}, a \in [0, 1]$$

Firm is renting capital from the consumer.

consumers are endowed with $K^s = \hat{k}$

$$\text{utility function } U(C, l) = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}$$

1. Formulate the competitive equilibrium

a. consumer maximize utility function subject to budget constraint

$$\max_{C, l} U(C, l) = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (1)$$

subject to

$$C \leq \underbrace{w(h-l)}_{\text{labor income}} + \underbrace{rK^s}_{\text{capital income}} + \underbrace{\pi}_{\text{firm's profit}} - \underbrace{T}_{\text{lump-sum tax}} \quad (2)$$

b. firm maximize profit

$$\max_{K^d, N^d} \pi = (K^d)^a (N^d)^{1-a} - wN^d - rK^d \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial N^d} = (1-a)(K^d)^a (N^d)^{-a} - w = 0 \Rightarrow w = (1-a)(K^d)^a (N^d)^{-a} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial K^d} = a(K^d)^{a-1} (N^d)^{1-a} - r = 0 \Rightarrow r = a(K^d)^{a-1} (N^d)^{1-a} \quad (5)$$

c. government collect the taxes to satisfy the exogenous government spending.

$$T^* = G \quad (6)$$

d. labor market clears, equilibrium wage w^* such that

$$N^d = N^s \quad (7)$$

e. capital market clears, equilibrium rental rate r^* such that

$$K^d = K^s \quad (8)$$

2. Social planner's problem

$$\max_{C, l, N, Y, K} U(C, l) = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}$$

$$s.t. \quad C + G = Y$$

$$Y = K^a N^{1-a}$$

$$N = h - l = 1 - l$$

$$K = \hat{k}$$

$$Y = \hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} \quad (9)$$

$$C = Y - G = \hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} - G \quad (10)$$

$$\max_l U(C(l), l) = \frac{(\hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (11)$$

Derive first order condition of equation 9

Derive the derivative U with respect to l

$$\frac{\partial l^{\frac{1-d}{1-d}}}{\partial l} = \frac{\partial \frac{1}{1-d} \times l^{1-d}}{\partial l} = l^{-d}$$

$$\frac{\partial U(C(l), l)}{\partial C} = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} = C^{-b} = (\hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} - G)^{-b}$$

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a})}{\partial l} = \hat{k}^a \times (1-a) \times (1-l)^{-a} \times (-1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dU(C(l), l)}{dl} &= \frac{\partial U(C(l), l)}{\partial C} \times \frac{\partial C(l)}{\partial l} + \frac{\partial U(C(l), l)}{\partial l} = 0 \\ &= \underbrace{(\hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} - G)^{-b}}_{\frac{\partial U(C(l), l)}{\partial C}} \times \underbrace{\hat{k}^a \times (1-a) \times (1-l)^{-a} \times (-1)}_{\frac{\partial C(l)}{\partial l}} + \underbrace{l^{-d}}_{\frac{\partial U(C(l), l)}{\partial l}} = 0 \\ &= (\hat{k}^a (1-l)^{1-a} - G)^{-b} \times \hat{k}^a \times (1-a) \times (1-l)^{-a} = l^{-d} \end{aligned}$$