

# Lecture 10

## Examples on Competitive Equilibrium and Social Planner's Problem

Hui-Jun Chen

The Ohio State University

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# Overview

After constructing both **consumers'** and **firms'** problem, we start to bring them together in **one-period model**:

- Lecture 8: **competitive equilibrium** (CE)
  - each agent solve their problems individually
  - aggregate decision determines “prices” (wage, rent, etc.)
- Lecture 9: **social planner's problem** (SPP)
  - imaginary and benevolent social planner determines the allocation
  - should be the most efficient outcome
- Lecture 10: CE and SPP examples

# Two Dimensional Chain Rule

Suppose we have a utility function  $U(C, l)$ , where  $C$  is the consumption, and  $l$  is the leisure, and both  $C = C(w)$  and  $l = l(w)$  are the function of equilibrium wage  $w$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dw}[U(C(w), l(w))] &= D_C U(C(w), l(w)) \times \frac{dC(w)}{dw} \\ &+ D_l U(C(w), l(w)) \times \frac{dl(w)}{dw} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

## “Taken as Given”

Here is a good rule of thumb:

When you solve the problem of an agent who **chooses  $y$  taking  $x$  as given**, the answer should take the form of  $y(x)$ .

**Example:** the consumer maximizes utility by **choosing consumption, leisure, and labor supply, taking the wage and profits as given**. ( $G = 0$ )

$$\max_{C, l, N^s} U(C, l) \quad \text{subject to} \quad C = wN^s + \pi \quad \text{and} \quad l + N^s = h \quad (2)$$

- solution takes the form:  $C(w, \pi), l(w, \pi), N^s(w, \pi)$
- why not  $h$ , or utility parameters? Not **endogenous to the model!**
- can repeat this idea for the firm to get  $N^d(w), Y(w), \pi(w)$

# “Endogenous to the Model”

What does equilibrium do? Figures out what level of “taken as given” but endogenous variables has to occur:

- consumer:  $\pi = \pi(w)$  from firm’s problem
- labor supply can be rewrite as:  $N^s(w, \pi) = N^s(w, \pi(w)) = N^s(w)$
- labor market clearing:  $N^d(w^*) = N^s(w^*)$ , where  $w^*$  is eqm wage

**Question:** any of the “taken as given variables” show up in the SPP?

- Ans: NO! Social planner is **benevolent dictator!**

# Model Environment

- Consumer:  $U(C, l) = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}$ , where  $b = 2$  and  $d = \frac{3}{2}$ .
  - $b, d$  are parameters
  - $h = 1$  is time endowment to allocate between leisure and labor supply
  - owns the firm, subject to lump-sum tax  $T \geq 0$
- Firm:  $zF(K, N) = zK^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}$ , where  $K = 1$  and  $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$  (param)
- Government:  $T = G$
- Labor market: both consumer and firm take wage rate  $w$  as given

# Experiments

- ① **Benchmark:**  $z = 1$  and  $G = 0$
- ② **Experiment 1:**  $z = 1.2$  and  $G = 0$
- ③ **Experiment 2:**  $z = 1$  and  $G = 0.5$

## Solve Benchmark in Social Planner's Problem

- PPF:  $C + G = zN^{1-\alpha}$ , where  $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$
- Time:  $N = h - l$ , where  $h = 1$
- Social Planner's Problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_l \quad & U(C(l), l) = \frac{C(l)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & C = Y - G \\
 & Y = zN^{1-\alpha} \\
 & N = 1 - l \\
 \Rightarrow \max_l \quad & \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$



## Solve Benchmark in Social Planner's Problem (Cont.)

$$\max_l \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{FOC: } \underbrace{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b}}_{\frac{(\cdot)^{1-b}}{1-b}} \times \underbrace{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}}_{z(1-l)^{1-\alpha}} \times \underbrace{(-1)}_{-l} + l^{-d} = 0 \quad (5)$$

$$G = 0: \quad z^{-b}(1-l)^{-b(1-\alpha)} \times (1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha} = l^{-d} \quad (6)$$

$$(1-\alpha)z^{1-b}(1-l)^{-\alpha-b+\alpha b} = l^{-d} \quad (7)$$


$$\alpha = 1/2; \quad b = 2; \quad d = 3/2 \quad (8)$$

$$\text{Apply: } \frac{1}{2}z^{-1}(1-l)^{-\frac{3}{2}} = l^{-\frac{3}{2}} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{2z} = \left(\frac{1-l}{l}\right)^{\frac{3}{2}} \quad (9)$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1-l}{l} = \left(\frac{1}{2z}\right)^{\frac{2}{3}} \Rightarrow l(z, 0) = \frac{1}{1 + (2z)^{-\frac{2}{3}}} \quad (10)$$

$$z = 1 \quad \Rightarrow l \approx 0.61, N \approx 0.39, Y = C \approx 0.62, w = \frac{z}{2}N^{-\frac{1}{2}} \approx 0.8 \quad (11)$$


# Visualization: Benchmark in SPP



Indifference curve and PPF are tangent at optimal bundle

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{slope at tangency } (C_0, l_0) \\
 & = \text{slope of IC } (-MRS_{l,C}) \\
 & = \text{slope of budget line } (-w) \\
 & = \text{slope of PPF } (-MRT_{l,C}) \\
 & = \text{slope of production fcn } (-MPN)
 \end{aligned}$$

## Solving with New TFP




Recall that we solved for the equilibrium quantity of leisure as a function of TFP:

$$l(z) = \frac{1}{1 + (2z)^{-\frac{2}{3}}} \quad (12)$$

So now we've solved for all possible "experiment 1's"! Just plug in  $z = 1.2$  to get  $l \approx 0.642$ , and plug in to get all the rest as well.


# Visualization: Experiment 1



Tangency preserved, just **shifted**

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{slope at tangency } (C_1, l_1) \\
 = & \text{slope of IC } (-MRS_{l,C}) \\
 = & \text{slope of budget line } (-w) \\
 = & \text{slope of PPF } (-MRT_{l,C}) \\
 = & \text{slope of production fcn } (-MPN)
 \end{aligned}$$

# Comparison: Experiment 1 and Benchmark




What's different?

- higher productivity means PPF shifts outward
- outward shift of PPF makes higher utility level (IC) attainable
- tangency is steeper: wage increases
- both consumption and leisure increase!

# Experiment 1: Income and Substitution Effect


Recall wage increase case from the consumer problem:



- **substitution effect:** move along IC but reflect new wage (i.e, new budget or new PPF)
  - $C$  increases,  $l$  decreases
- **income effect:** move up to new budget line / PPF
  - $C$  and  $l$  both increase
- here, income effect wins and leisure increases

# Comparison: Experiment 2 and Benchmark

Note: SPP harder to solve by hand with  $G \neq 0$  [details](#). But, can still analyze with graphs!



- higher government spending shifts PPF **inward**
- inward shift of PPF lowers utility level (IC) attainable
- budget shallower: wage falls
- consumption, leisure fall (recall normal goods assumption)
- can show output increases

# Response to Data

Effect of $\uparrow$ in	TFP	G
Output	Increase	Increase
Consumption	Increase	Decrease
Employment	Ambiguous	Increase
Wage	Increase	Decrease


TFP is a overall better match! [Real Business Cycle](#) theory

- recall key [business cycle facts](#): employment, consumption, real wage are all procyclical
- recall key [trend](#): output has grown steadily for last century
- question: which model is more consistent with these facts?



# Data: Government Spending from WWII

Figure 5.7 GDP, Consumption, and Government Expenditures



- large increase in  $G$  to finance war effort
- modest increase in  $Y$
- slight decline in  $C$
- consistent with our model!

# Data: Solow Residual, $z = \frac{Y}{K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}}$

Figure 4.18 The Solow Residual for the United States





Figure 5.11 Deviations from Trend in GDP and the Solow Residual



# Appendix

# How to solve $G \neq 0$

Back

$$\max_l \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (13)$$

$$\text{FOC: } z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b} \times (1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha} = l^{-d} \quad (14)$$

$$\text{Divide: } (z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b} = \frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \quad (15)$$

$$\text{power of } -\frac{1}{b}: z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G = \left[ \frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{b}} \quad (16)$$

$$\text{Solve } G: G = F(l) = z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - \left[ \frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{b}} \quad (17)$$

$$\iff l = F^{-1}(G) \quad (18)$$