## ECON 2002.01 PROBLEM SET 3

## Unit 6 Hui-Jun Chen

(1) (OUP-U6-Q1) Which of the following statements is true?

- (A) An order given in a firm is a request for a job that can be rejected by the employee.
- (B) In a market, prices motivate and constrain people's actions, and are determined as a result of the actions of a large number of participants.
- (C) Contracts for products sold in markets temporarily transfer authority over the product from the seller to the buyer.
- (D) Asymmetric information in a firm is the details about the asymmetry of authority within the firm.
- (2) (OUP-U6-Q2) Which of the following statements is true?
  - (A) The managers are residual claimants of the firm's profits.
  - (B) The owners of a firm are the only individuals who hold the firm's shares.
  - (C) With the separation of ownership and control, decisions are made by managers while the benefits of the decisions accrue to the owners.
  - (D) The separation of ownership and control has costs that almost always outweigh the benefits.
- (3) (OUP-U6-Q3) Which of the following statements regarding employment contracts are correct? \_\_\_\_\_
  - (A) The firm is required to state exactly what it needs the employee to do in an employment contract.
  - (B) The firm needs to specify exactly how much effort employees are expected to put into their job.

- (C) Employees' effort levels cannot be the basis of an enforceable contract.
- (D) Employment contracts are incomplete as they can only specify things that both the employees and the business owner care about.
- (4) (OUP-U6-Q8) Thomas earns £12 per hour in his current job and works 36 hours a week. He loves his job and puts in his maximum effort with no disutility. In fact, Thomas earns extra utility worth £3 per hour from camaraderie, status, and enjoyment of the job. If he loses this job Thomas has two choices. Either he is able to be self-employed, which earns him £7 an hour for 36 hours a week of work but also gives him disutility equivalent to £2 per hour, or he can be unemployed and receive an unemployment benefit of £150 per week. Thomas is expected to be able to find another job similar to his current one in 24 weeks. Then: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (A) Thomas's next best option is to be unemployed.
  - (B) The employment rent per hour is  $\pounds 8$ .
  - (C) Thomas's employment rent is £9,360.
  - (D) If Thomas chooses the self-employment option then his loss of employment rent is £8,640.
- (OUP-U6-Q13) Consider isocost lines drawn on a graph with hourly wage on the horizontal axis and effort per hour on the vertical axis. Which of the following statements is correct?
  - (A) Isocost lines intersect the horizontal axis at the reservation wage.
  - (B) The slope of the isocost line is the employer's marginal rate of transformation of higher wages into worker effort.
  - (C) Steeper isocost lines represent higher cost per unit of effort.
  - (D) For an isocost lines with a slope of 0.07, the cost of unit of effort is \$14.3.
- (6) (OUP-U6-Q16) The figure depicts the efficiency wage equilibrium of a worker and a firm. Based on this information, which of the following statements is correct?



- (A) At A, given that the firm pays the hourly wage of \$12, the worker's best response is to exert an effort of 0.5.
- (B) At A, given that the worker exerts an effort level of 0.5, the firm's best response is to offer the hourly wage of \$12.
- (C) Therefore the worker receives no rent.
- (D) The employer makes profits by coercing the worker to put in some effort.

(7) (UCL-J15-Q3) If unemployment benefits increase: \_\_\_\_\_

- (A) A worker's effort increases because the employment rent increases.
- (B) Effort decreases because the disutility of effort decreases.
- (C) The employment rent will fall unless the firm raises the wage.
- (D) The employment rent will increase unless the firm raises the wage.

- (OUP-U6-Q19) Consider a worker's best response curve in the labour discipline model. Currently the firm chooses to pay £12 per hour to minimise the cost of effort, which induces an effort level of 0.6 from the worker. Now consider a rise in the unemployment benefit. Then: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (A) At the wage rate of £12 per hour the worker will now exert more than 0.6 of effort.
  - (B) The firm can lower the wage rate to below  $\pounds 12$  to maintain the effort level of 0.6.
  - (C) The firm's new wage offer that minimises the cost of effort will be higher than  $\pounds 12$ .
  - (D) The firm's maximum units of effort per dollar of wage cost will be higher than before the rise in the unemployment benefit.
- (9) (TEA-U6-Q2) Which of the following statements best describes the game played by the employer and the employee in the labour discipline model? \_\_\_\_\_
  - (A) The game is a simultaneous game in which the employer chooses the wage level and the employee chooses the effort level simultaneously.
  - (B) The game is a one-off game in which the wage and effort levels are determined once and for all.
  - (C) The worker selects the effort level that balances his desire to keep his job with his desire to not exhaust himself on the job.
  - (D) The employer will attempt to maximise the firm's profits by offering a wage equal to the worker's reservation wage.
- (ECO-U6-Q5) Maria earns \$12 per hour in her current job and works 35 hours a week. Her disutility of effort is equivalent to a cost of \$2 per hour of work. If she loses her job, she will receive unemployment benefit equivalent to \$6 per hour. Additionally, being unemployed has psychological and social costs equivalent to \$1 per hour. Then: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (A) The employment rent per hour is \$3.
  - (B) Maria's reservation wage is \$6 per hour.

- (C) Maria's employment rent if she can get another job with the same wage rate after 44 weeks of being unemployed is \$6,160.
- (D) Maria's employment rent if she can only get a job at a lower wage rate after 44 weeks of being unemployed is more than \$7,700.