Unit 6 The Firm: Owners, Managers, and Employees

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Introduction

Introduction

How does the firm interacts internally and externally?

- Firms are legal entity, yet still are composed by human
 - internal: Owner(s) v.s. Managers
 - external: Employees (labor market), consumer (goods market)
- Internal conflict: asymmetric information (e.g. Akerlof (1970))
- External conflict: hidden action (Principal-Agent Problem)
- \blacksquare As before, wage is determined by MRS=MRT
- Further reading: Unit 6

Internal Structure of the Firm

Firm's Internal Structure

Definition


Firm is a business organization which (1) hires ppl, (2) buy inputs to produce good/services, and (3) set prices \geq cost.

Intro

Internal

Black arrow downward:

- Owners: set long-term goal
- Managers: implement owners' goal by assigning tasks
- Workers: doing tasks



Labor

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Firm's Internal Structure

Definition


Firm is a business organization which (1) hires ppl, (2) buy inputs to produce good/services, and (3) set prices \geq cost.

Intro

Internal

Green arrow upward:

- Owners: Receive profit as a result of management
- Managers: payment not directly related to effort ⇒ other's \$, riskier investment / lowering effort
- Workers: salary not increasing with effort



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Align the Interests

- Contracts are incomplete: outcome depends on future/unknown events, and hard to measure effort
- Incomplete contracts are inevitable, since modern job are mostly not able to measure output and works as a team
- Ways to alleviate incomplete contract:
 - $lacksymbol{0}$ pay with company shares: company profit \uparrow , share price \uparrow
 - piece rate pay: \$5 to assembly one toy (low-end job)

8 monitoring

Labor Discipline Model

Why do workers work hard?

Workers work hard while firms' cannot directly measure effort because

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Appendix

- work ethic
- 2 feelings of responsibility
- S reciprocate a feeling of gratitude for good working conditions
- Ø benefits for measurable output
- **6** promotions
- 6 fear of being fired

 \ldots Rational thinking sometimes means negative thinking \oplus

Fear of being Fired

- Rent in Economics: payment to the owner greater than the costs
- \blacksquare If workers being unemployed, they get unemployment benefits \Rightarrow reservation wage
- Employment rent: benefit from employment disutility from work reservation wage, includes
 - lost income when searching
 - cost to start a new job, e.g. relocation
 - Loss of non-wage benefits
 - Social costs (scarring effects, lost of company connections/skill)
- Larger employment rent (higher wage) ⇒ larger cost of job loss ⇒ workers work hard to reduce chance of getting fired

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Employment Game

• Employer: choose maximum wage to keep worker work hard enough

• payoff: output - wage

Worker: choose minimum effort to keep him/herself from firing

• payoff: employment rent

• Workers are the **supply side** in labor market: trade off are **MRT**

• Employers are the **demand side** in labor market: trade off are **MRS**

6 Best response curve:

- for workers: optimal amount of effort workers will exert for each wage offered
- for employers: optimal level of wage employers will offer for each targeted level of effort.

Best response curves

Employers: assume revenue doesn't change, firms minimize cost to max profit


 \Rightarrow find a isocost line that minimize wage spending

Workers: Feasible frontier for wage & effort

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Appendix




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Determining Wages

Equilibrium is at MRS = MRT, efficiency wage = 12 > reservation wage



Involuntary Unemployment


Definition

Involuntary unemployment is being out of work, but preferring to have a job at the wages/working conditions as other workers.

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- Must have involuntary unemployment in the labor discipline model!
 - ... ensure employment rent is high enough for workers to put in effort.
- Foreshadowing: How is unemployment rate \u03c5 affects the best response curve?



Worker's Best Response Curve with different unemployment rate

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Introduction for Principal-Agent Models

Incomplete Contracts in General

Incomplete contracts do not only occur in employment relationships.

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- Incomplete contracts arise when:
 - information is not verifiable
 - the relationship covers periods of time
 - there is uncertainty
 - there are difficulties with measurement
 - judiciary is absent
 - preferences for omitting some information

Principal-Agent models

- Principal-agent models capture interactions under incomplete contracts
 - e.g. the firm is the principal and the worker is the agent
- Agent takes action that is hidden from the principal, which is why the principal cannot verify it.
 - there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent
 - over some action that may be taken by the agent
 - and this action cannot be subjected to a complete contract.
- The information about the action may be either asymmetric or unverifiable.

References

References I

Akerlof, George A. (1970) "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 84 (3), 488, 10.2307/1879431.